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Abstract—Sharing economy is a distributed peer-to-peer eco-
nomic paradigm, which gives rise to a variety of social in-
teractions for economic purposes. One fundamental distributed
decision-making process is coalition formation for sharing certain
replaceable resources collaboratively, for example, sharing hotel
rooms among travelers, sharing taxi-rides among passengers,
and sharing regular passes among users. Motivated by the
applications of sharing economy, this paper studies a coalition
formation game subject to the capacity of K participants per
coalition. The participants in each coalition are supposed to split
the associated cost according to a given cost-sharing mechanism.
A stable coalition structure is established when no group of par-
ticipants can opt out to form another coalition that leads to lower
individual payments. We quantify the inefficiency of distributed
decision-making processes under a cost-sharing mechanism by
the strong price of anarchy (SPoA), comparing a worst-case stable
coalition structure and a social optimum. In particular, we derive
SPoA for common fair cost-sharing mechanisms (e.g., equal-split,
proportional-split, egalitarian and Nash bargaining solutions of
bargaining games, and usage based cost-sharing). We show that
the SPoA for equal-split, proportional-split, and usage based cost-
sharing (under certain conditions) is Θ(logK), whereas the one
for egalitarian and Nash bargaining solutions is O(
√
K logK).
Therefore, distributed decision-making processes under common
fair cost-sharing mechanisms induce only moderate inefficiency.
Index Terms—Sharing economy, coalition formation, social and
economic networks, fair cost-sharing mechanisms
I. INTRODUCTION
The rise of “sharing economy” [1] has created a new
paradigm of social and economic networks, which promotes
distributed peer-to-peer interactions and bypasses traditional
centralized hierarchal service providers and intermediaries.
Sharing economy is often facilitated by the advent of perva-
sive information technology platforms, especially by mobile
computing and digital social platforms. One fundamental
distributed decision-making process in sharing economy is
coalition formation for sharing resources and facilities with
excess capacity among users collaboratively and efficiently.
We highlight some examples of sharing economy as follows:
1) Hotel Room Sharing: Travelers may share hotel rooms
with other fellow travelers, because multiple-occupancy
rooms are more economical. The sharing processes are
achieved through private arrangements among travelers.
2) Taxi-ride Sharing: Commuters may share taxi-rides be-
cause of lower taxi fares, despite that the taxicabs may
take a detour to pick-up or drop-off other passengers.
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3) Pass Sharing: Certain anonymous regular passes are
validated within a certain fixed period of time (e.g.,
accesses to public transportation or public facilities),
which may be shareable among multiple holders, if
they do not overlap in their usage times. Note that this
example also applies to co-owning or co-leasing physical
properties (e.g., houses, cars and parking lots).
In this paper, we study a class of distributed decision-
making processes for sharing economy. In particular, we
consider the problem with a set of participants forming
coalitions to share certain replaceable resources from a large
pool of available resources (e.g., hotel rooms, taxicabs, regular
passes), such that any subset of participants can always form
a coalition using separate resources, independent from other
coalitions. We formulate a coalition formation game, wherein
participants form arbitrary coalitions of their own accord
to share the associated cost, subject to a constraint on the
maximum number of participants per coalition.
There are two main aspects investigated in this paper:
1) Inefficiency of Distributed Decision-Making: Since
there is a capacity per coalition such that not all par-
ticipants can form a single coalition, there will exist
potentially multiple coalitions and the self-interested
participants will opt for the lower payments. Distributed
self-interested behavior often gives rise to outcomes that
deviate from a social optimum. A critical question is
related to the inefficiency of distributed decision-making
processes. We quantify the inefficiency of distributed
decision-making processes by the Strong Price of An-
archy (SPoA), a common metric in Algorithmic Game
Theory that compares the worst-case ratio between the
self-interested outcomes (that allow any group of users
to deviate jointly) and a social optimum [2]–[5].
2) Fair Cost-Sharing Mechanisms: Sharing economy can
be regarded as an alternative to the for-profit sector,
which resembles cooperative organizations and favors
distributive justice. When participants share the costs,
there is a notion of fairness. We aim to characterize the
inefficiency of distributed decision-making under com-
mon fair cost-sharing mechanisms. First, we consider
typical fair cost-sharing concepts such as equal-split,
proportional-split, and usage based cost-sharing. Second,
we formulate the cost-sharing problem as a bargaining
game. Thus, the well-known bargaining game solutions
(e.g., egalitarian and Nash bargaining solutions) [6] can
be applied in the context of sharing economy.
This paper presents a comprehensive study for the SPoA
of a general model of coalition formation, considering various
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2TABLE I: A summary of our results.
Equal-split Proportional-split Egalitarian/Nash Usage Based
Existence of Stable Coalition X X X Only in some problems
Strong Price of Anarchy Θ(logK) Θ(logK) O(
√
K logK) Ω(K) (in general)
Θ(logK) (under certain conditions)
common fair cost-sharing mechanisms.
A. Our Contributions
We consider K-capacitated coalitions, where K is the
maximum number of sharing participants per coalition. A
stable coalition structure, wherein no group of participants can
opt out to form another coalition that leads to lower individual
payments, is a likely self-interested outcome. The results in
this paper are summarized as follows (and in Table I).
1) The SPoA for any budget balanced cost-sharing mech-
anism is O(K).
2) However, the SPoA for equal-split and proportional-split
cost-sharing is only Θ(logK).
3) The SPoA for egalitarian and Nash bargaining solutions
is O(
√
K logK).
4) The SPoA for usage based cost-sharing is generally
Ω(K). However, we provide natural sufficient conditions
to improve the SPoA to be Θ(logK), which apply to
the examples of sharing economy in this paper.
5) Therefore, distributed decision-making processes under
common fair cost-sharing mechanisms induce only mod-
erate inefficiency.
6) We also study the existence of stable coalition structures.
II. RELATED WORK
Our problem belongs to the topic of network cost-sharing
and hedonic coalition formation problems [7]–[16]. A study
particularly related to our results is the price of anarchy for
stable matching and the various extensions to K-sized coali-
tions [17], [18]. Our coalition formation game is a subclass
of hedonic coalition formation games [8], [13] that allows
arbitrary coalitions subject to a constraint on the maximum
number of participants per coalition. This model appears to
be realistic in many practical settings of sharing economy1.
Our work differs from typical cooperative games. In our
coalition formation game, each player joins a coalition that
incurs a lower individual payment, under a given cost-sharing
mechanism. On the other hand, typical cooperative games
generally do not consider a specific cost-sharing mechanism,
but find a cost-sharing allocation according to certain axioms.
One may regard the results about stable matching in [17],
[18] as a special case of K = 2 in our model. How-
ever, unlike the stable matching problem, our model has
additional structure that can be harnessed for tighter results
(e.g., monotonicity). For example, according to [17], the price
of anarchy for Matthew’s effect (equivalently, proportional-
split cost-sharing) can be unbounded. Here with the help of
1For example, consider taxi-ride sharing. Any passengers can form a
coalition to share a taxi-ride, subject to the maximum capacity of a taxicab.
monotonicity, we show that it is Θ(logK). We also study other
cost-sharing mechanisms, such as egalitarian, Nash bargaining
solutions, and usage based cost-sharing mechanisms that are
not considered in [17], [18]. Moreover, [18] is based on the
comparison of the utility of a stable matching, while our results
are based on the comparison of the cost of a stable coalition
structure. Although it is possible to derive some of our results
(for K = 2) from the previous results, the bounds obtained this
way are typically weaker than ours and the gap can increase
as a linear function of K.
Network cost-sharing games with capacitated links and non-
anonymous cost functions [15], [19], [20] are closely related to
our problem. Non-anonymous cost functions may depend on
the identity of the players in the coalition, so as to capture the
asymmetries between the players because of different service
requirements. In [15], a logarithmic upper bound on the price
of anarchy considering the Shapley value in network cost-
sharing games with non-anonymous submodular cost functions
was given. Our problem can be modeled by a network cost-
sharing game with non-anonymous cost functions. In partic-
ular, our model is a special case of a K-capacitated network
cost-sharing game with a simple structure of n parallel links
and non-anonymous cost functions such that a strategy profile
of the users in the network game corresponds to a coalition
structure2. However, the key difference of our model from
those in [7], [11], [15] is that we consider replaceable re-
sources from a large pool of available resources, such that a
subset of deviating users can always form a new coalition,
independent from other users. This is not true in general
network cost-sharing games, when there are limited resources
(e.g., links) that a deviating coalition of players can utilize, and
it may not be possible to form arbitrary coalitions independent
from others. Our model allows us to derive SPoA bounds for
diverse cost-sharing mechanisms, whereas only specific cost-
sharing mechanisms (e.g., the Shapley value) were considered
in general network cost-sharing games.
It is also worth mentioning how our results of usage
based cost-sharing relate to cost-sharing with anonymous cost
functions in network design games [7] or connection games
[11]. On one hand, our model is simpler as we do not assume
connectivity requirements in a network, but only an abstract
setting that allows arbitrary coalitions up to a certain capacity
(but we allow non-anonymous cost functions). On the other
hand, one of the cost-sharing mechanisms we consider (i.e.,
2For example, consider taxi-ride sharing. An additional passenger can join a
taxi-ride with certain existing passengers who have already formed a coalition,
only if all of them will not be worse-off after the change. Otherwise, the
existing passengers can always reject the additional passenger by keeping their
current coalition. This is always possible in a network cost-sharing game with
n parallel links.
3usage based cost-sharing) resembles in some sense that used in
[7], [11] if we interpret the resources used by one participant
as his chosen path or tree in the network design game. Similar
to the case in [7] (with respect to strong Nash equilibrium), a
usage based cost-sharing mechanism may not admit a stable
coalition structure. Noteworthily, the SPoA in usage based
cost-sharing in our model can increase as a linear function
of K. Nonetheless, we provide general sufficient conditions
for usage based cost-sharing to induce logarithmic SPoA.
III. MODEL
This section presents a general model of coalition formation
for sharing certain resources, motivated by the applications of
sharing economy. Consider an n-participant cooperative game
in coalition form. The coalitions formed by the subsets of
participants are associated with a real-valued cost function.
The participants in a coalition are supposed to split the cost
according to a certain payment function. However, as a de-
parture from traditional cooperative games, there is a capacity
per each coalition, such that not all participants can form a
single coalition. Hence, when given a payment function, the
participants will opt for coalitions that lead to lower individual
payments subject to a capacity per coalition.
A. Problem Formulation
The set of n participants is denoted by N . A coalition
structure is a partition of N denoted by P ⊂ 2N , such that⋃
G∈P G = N and G1 ∩ G2 = ∅ for any pair G1, G2 ∈ P .
Let the set of all partitions of N be P . Each element
G ∈ P is called a coalition. The set of singleton coalitions,
Pself , {{i} : i ∈ N}, is called the default coalition structure,
wherein no one forms a coalition with others.
This paper considers arbitrary coalition structures with at
most K participants per coalition, which is motivated by
scenarios of sharing replaceable resources; see Section III-B
for examples. The notion of resources will be introduced later
in Sec. III-A2, and our model does not always rely on the
notion of resources. In practice, K is often much less than n.
LetPK , {P ∈P : |G| ≤ K for each G ∈ P} be the set of
feasible coalition structures, such that each coalition consists
of at most K participants.
1) Cost Function: A cost c(G) (also known as a charac-
teristic function) is assigned to each coalition of participants
G ∈ P ∈PK , subject to the following properties:
(C1) c(∅) = 0 and c(G) > 0 if G 6= ∅.
(C2) Monotonicity: c(G) ≥ c(H), if H ⊆ G.
Monotonicity captures natural coalition formation with in-
creasing cost as the number of participants. The total cost
of coalition structure P is denoted by c(P) , ∑G∈P c(G).
For brevity, we also denote c({i}) by ci, where ci is called
the default cost of participant i, that is, when i forms no
coalition with others. When a subset of participants are in-
dexed by N ′ = {i1, i2, ..., ij} ⊆ N , we simply denote the
corresponding default costs by {c1, c2, ..., cj}.
A K-capacitated social optimum is a coalition structure
P∗K ∈PK that minimizes the total cost:
(K-MINCOALITION) P∗K ∈ arg minP∈PK c(P) (1)
When K = 2, a social optimum P∗K can be found in
polynomial time by reducing the coalition formation problem
to a (general graph) matching problem. When K > 2, K-
MINCOALITION is an NP-hard problem (see Appendix).
2) Canonical Resources: There is often a resource being
shared by each coalition (e.g., a hotel room, a taxicab, a
pass). The resources are usually replaceable from a large
pool of available resources in the sharing economy. Hence,
any subset of participants can always form a coalition using
separate resources, independent from other coalitions. For each
coalition G, we consider a canonical resource, which is a class
of replaceable resources that can satisfy G, rather than any
specific resource. The canonical resource shared by a coalition
will not be affected by the canonical resources shared by
other coalitions. Because of the consideration of canonical
resources, our model exhibits different properties than the
network sharing games with limited resources [15], [19], [20].
Let R(G) be the feasible set of canonical resources that
can satisfy coalition G. It is naturally assumed that R(H) ⊇
R(G), when H ⊆ G, because the canonical resources that can
satisfy a larger coalition G should also satisfy a smaller coali-
tion H (by ignoring the participants in G\H). Each canonical
resource r ∈ R(G) is characterized by a cost cr, and a set
of involved facilities F (r). Each facility f ∈ F (r) carries
a cost cf , such that
∑
f∈F(r) c
f = cr. We do not require
that every participant of G utilizes the same facilities. Let
Fi(r) ⊆ F (r) be the set of facilities utilized by participant
i ∈ G, when r is shared by G. Let r(G) ∈ arg minr∈R(G){cr}
be the lowest cost canonical resource for coalition G. Hence,
we set c(G) = cr(G) and monotonicity is satisfied. If there are
multiple lowest cost canonical resources, one is selected by a
certain deterministic tie-breaking rule.
B. Motivating Examples
We present a few motivating examples in sharing economy
to illustrate the aforementioned model.
1) Hotel Room Sharing: Consider N as a set travelers to
share hotel rooms. Each traveler i ∈ N is associated with a
tuple (tini , t
out
i ,Ai), where t
in
i is the arrival time, t
out
i is the
departure time, and Ai is the area of preferred locations of
hotels. Let K be the maximum number of travelers that can
share a room. A canonical resource is a room booking r,
associated with a tuple (tinr , t
out
r , ar), where t
in
r is the check-in
time, toutr is the check-out time, and ar is the hotel location. We
assume that there is a large pool of available rooms for each
location, and we do not consider a specific room. The feasible
set R(G) is a set of room bookings shared by a coalition of
travelers G, if the following conditions are satisfied:
1) |G| ≤ K;
2) ar ∈
⋂
i∈G Ai;
3) tinr ≤ tini and toutr ≥ touti for all i ∈ G.
4(Note that the monotonicity assumption is satisfied: R(H) ⊇
R(G), when H ⊆ G.) In this example, F (r) is be the set of
days during [tinr , t
out
r ] for room booking r, andFi(r) be the set
of days that i stays in room booking r. For each f ∈ F (r),
cf is the hotel rate of day f .
2) Taxi-ride Sharing: Consider N as a set of passengers to
share taxi-rides. Each passenger i ∈ N is associated with a
tuple (vsi , v
d
i , t
s
i, t
d
i ), where v
s
i is the source location, v
d
i is the
destination location, tsi is the earliest departure time, and t
d
i
is the latest arrival time. Let K be the maximum number of
passengers that can share a ride. A canonical resource is a ride
r, associated with a sequence of locations (v1, ..., vm) and a
sequence of arrival timeslots (t1, ..., tm) in an increasing order.
We assume that there is a large pool of available taxicabs, and
we do not consider a specific taxicab. The feasible set R(G)
is a set of rides shared by a coalition of travelers G, if the
following conditions are satisfied:
1) |G| ≤ K;
2) All the locations (vsi , v
d
i )i∈G are present in the sequence
(v1, ..., vm);
3) tr(vsi) < tr(v
d
i ), tr(v
s
i) ≥ tsi and tr(vdi ) ≤ tdi for all
i ∈ G, where tr(v) is the arrival timeslot of ride r at
location v.
Note that the hotel room sharing problem may be regarded
as a one-dimensional version of the taxi-ride sharing problem,
if the preferred location constraint is not considered, and we
let each tuple (tini , t
out
i ) in hotel room sharing problem be the
source and destination locations. Let F (r) is the set of road
segments traversed by ride r, and Fi(r) be the set of road
segments that i travels in ride r. For each f ∈ F (r), let cf
be the taxi fare for road segment f .
3) Pass Sharing: Consider N as a set of regular-pass
holders who want to form coalitions to share some anonymous
passes. Each user i ∈ N is associated with a set of required
usage timeslots Ti. Let K be the maximum number of sharing
users, so as to limit the hassle of circulating the pass. A
canonical resource is a pass r, associated with a set of
allowable timeslots Tr. We assume that there is a large pool
of available passes, and we do not consider a specific pass.
The feasible set R(G) is a set of passes shared by a coalition
of travelers G, if the following conditions are satisfied:
1) |G| ≤ K;
2) Ti∩Tj = ∅ for all i, j ∈ G, i 6= j (i.e., no one overlaps
in their required timeslots);
3)
⋃
i∈G Ti ⊆ Tr.
This setting also applies to sharing physical properties (e.g.,
houses, cars and parking lots). Let F (r) are the set of
timeslots required by pass r, and cf be the cost of each
timeslot in F (r). A user needs to cover the cost when he
uses the pass or shares the cost with other participants when
no one uses it. Hence, let Fi(r) = Ti ∪
(
Tr\(
⋃
j∈G Tj)
)
,
when i shares pass r in coalition G.
C. Cost-Sharing Mechanisms
A coalition of participants G are supposed to share the cost
c(G). Let the cost (or payment) contributed by participant i ∈
G be pi(G). The utility of participant i is given by:
ui
(
pi(G)
)
, ci − pi(G) (2)
The following natural properties can be satisfied by payment
function pi(·):
• Budget Balance: pi(·) is said to be budget balanced, if∑
i∈G pi(G) = c(G) for every G ⊆ N .
• Non-negative Payment: pi(·) is said to be non-negative,
if pi(G) ≥ 0 for every G ∈ P ∈ PK . If non-positive
payment is allowed, then it possible that pi(G) < 0 for
some i ∈ G.
This paper considers the following fair cost-sharing mech-
anisms. Note that only usage based cost-sharing mechanism
takes into account the notion of resources, while the other cost-
sharing mechanisms do not rely on the notion of resources.
1) Equal-split Cost-Sharing: The cost is split equally
among all participants: for i ∈ G,
peqi (G) ,
c(G)
|G| (3)
2) Proportional-split Cost-Sharing: The cost is split pro-
portionally according to the participants’ default costs:
for i ∈ G,
pppi (G) ,
ci · c(G)∑
j∈G cj
(4)
Namely, ui
(
pppi (G)
)
= ci · (
∑
j∈G cj)−c(G)∑
j∈G cj
. This ap-
proach is also called Matthew’s effect in [17].
3) Bargaining Based Cost-Sharing: One can formulate
the cost-sharing problem as a bargaining game with a
feasible set and a disagreement point. In our model,
the feasible set is the set of utilities (ui)i∈G, such that∑
i∈G ui ≤
∑
i∈G ci − c(G) (⇔
∑
i∈G pi ≥ c(G)).
The disagreement point is (ui = 0)i∈G, such that each
participant pays only the respective default cost. There
are two bargaining solutions in the literature [6]:
• Egalitarian Bargaining Solution is given by:
pegai (G) , ci −
(
∑
j∈G cj)− c(G)
|G| (5)
Namely, every participant in each coalition has the
same utility: ui
(
pegai (G)
)
=
(
∑
j∈G cj)−c(G)
|G| for all
i ∈ G. Note that non-positive payment is possible
because it may need to compensate those with
low default costs to reach equal utility at every
participant3.
• Nash Bargaining Solution is given by:(
pnashi (G)
)
i∈G ∈ arg max(pi(G))i∈G
∏
i∈G
ui
(
pi(G)
)
(6)
subject to ∑
i∈G
pi(G) = c(G)
3For example, consider G = {i, j, k}, such that cj = ck = c(G) = 1 and
ci = 0.1. Then p
ega
i (G) = −0.26.
5One can impose an additional constraint of non-
negative payments: pi(G) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ G.
4) Usage Based Cost-Sharing: Also known as Shapley
cost-sharing [7]. We consider a cost-sharing mechanism
that takes into account the usage structure of resources
of participants. Recall that r(G) denotes a lowest-cost
canonical resource for coalition G. Let N f (r(G)) be
the set of participants that share the same facility f in
r(G). The cost is split equally among the participants
who utilize the same facilities:
pubi (G) ,
∑
f∈Fi(r(G))
cf
|N f (r(G))| (7)
For example, in taxi-ride sharing, passengers will split
the cost equally for each road segment with those pas-
sengers traveled together in the respective road segment.
D. Stable Coalition and Strong Price of Anarchy
Given payment function pi(·), a coalition of participants G
is called a blocking coalition with respect to coalition structure
P if all participants in G can strictly reduce their payments
when they form a coalition G to share the cost instead. A
coalition structure is called stable coalition structure, denoted
by PˆK ∈ PK , if there exists no blocking coalition with
respect to PˆK . The existence of a stable coalition structure
depends on the cost-sharing mechanism (see Appendix).
Note that a stable coalition structure is also a strong Nash
equilibrium4 in our model. However, there is a difference
between the case of sharing canonical resources and that of
limited resources. For sharing canonical resources, an addi-
tional member can join an existing coalition to create a larger
coalition, only if all of the participants in the new coalition
will not be worse-off after the change. Otherwise, the existing
coalition can always reject the additional member by keeping
the current canonical resource. However, for sharing limited
resources, a coalition may be forced to accept an additional
member, even they will be worse-off, because they cannot
find a new resource to share with. In this case, a strong Nash
equilibrium may not be a stable coalition structure.
Define the Strong Price of Anarchy (SPoA) as the worst-
case ratio between the cost of a stable coalition structure and
that of a social optimum over any feasible costs subject to
(C1)-(C2):
SPoAK , max
c(·), PˆK
c(PˆK)
c(P∗K)
(8)
Specifically, the strong price of anarchy when using specific
cost-sharing mechanisms are denoted by SPoAeqK , SPoA
pp
K ,
SPoAegaK , SPoA
nash
K , SPoA
ub
K , respectively.
IV. PRELIMINARY RESULTS
Before we derive the SPoA for various cost-sharing mecha-
nisms, we present some preliminary results that will be useful
4A strong Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium, in which no group of
players can cooperatively deviate in an allowable way that benefits all of its
members.
in our proofs. In the following we denote the K-th harmonic
number by HK ,
∑K
s=1
1
s .
Theorem 1. Recall the default coalition structure Pself ,{{i} : i ∈ N}. We have
K · c(P∗K) ≥ c(Pself) (9)
Consider a budget balanced payment function pi(·). Let PˆK
be a respective K-capacitated stable coalition structure. Then,
c(Pself) ≥ c(PˆK) (10)
Hence, the SPoA for pi(·) is upper bounded by SPoAK ≤ K.
Proof. First, by monotonicity, we obtain for any G ∈ P∗K
c(G) ≥ max
i∈G
{ci} ≥
∑
i∈G ci
|G| ≥
∑
i∈G ci
K
(11)
Hence,
c(P∗K) =
∑
G∈P∗K
c(G) ≥ 1
K
∑
i∈N
ci =
c(Pself)
K
(12)
Since P∗K is a stable coalition structure, then pi(G) ≤ ci
for every G ∈ P∗K . Otherwise, every i ∈ G can strictly reduce
his payment by forming a singleton coalition individually.
Lastly, since pi(·) is a budget balanced payment function,
it follows that
c(Pself) =
∑
i∈N
ci ≥
∑
G∈PˆK
∑
i∈G
pi(G) = c(PˆK) (13)
However, we will show that the SPoA for various cost-
sharing mechanisms is O(logK) or O(
√
K logK).
To derive an upper bound for the SPoA, the following
lemma provides a general tool. First, define the following
notation for a non-negative payment function pi(·):
α
({pi(·)}i∈N ) , max
c(·), H1⊃···⊃HK
∑K
s=1 pis(Hs)
c(H1)
, (14)
where H1, ...,HK are a collection of subsets, such that each
Hs , {is, ..., iK} for some i1, ..., iK ∈ N . Note that α(·) is
non-decreasing in K. See Appendix for a proof.
Lemma 1. Suppose pi(·) is a budget balanced non-negative
payment function. Given a K-capacitated stable coalition
structure PˆK , and a feasible coalition structure P ∈ PK ,
then
c(PˆK)
c(P) ≤ α
({pi(·)}i∈N )
Thus, if PˆK is a worst-case stable coalition structure and
P = P∗K is a social optimal coalition structure, then we obtain
an upper bound for the SPoA with respect to {pi(·)}i∈N :
SPoAK ≤ α
({pi(·)}i∈N )
Proof. Let P = {G1, ..., Gh}. Define H11 , G1. Then there
exists a participant i11 ∈ H11 and a coalition Gˆ11 ∈ PˆK , such
that i11 ∈ Gˆ11 and pi11(H11 ) ≥ pi11(Gˆ11); otherwise, all the
participants in H11 would form a coalition H
1
1 to strictly reduce
6their payments, which contradicts the fact that PˆK is a stable
coalition structure.
Next, define H12 , H11\{i11}. Note that H12 is a feasible
coalition, because arbitrary coalition structures with at most
K participants per coalition are allowed in our model. By the
same argument, there exists i12 ∈ H12 and a coalition Gˆ12 ∈ PˆK ,
such that i12 ∈ Gˆ12 and pi12(H12 ) ≥ pi12(Gˆ12).
Let Gt = {it1, ..., itKt}, for any t ∈ {1, ..., h}. Continuing
this argument, we obtain a collection of sets {Hts}, where each
Hts , {its, ..., itKt} satisfies the following condition:
for any t ∈ {1, ..., h} and s ∈ {1, ...,Kt}, there
exists Gˆts ∈ PˆK , such that its ∈ Gˆts and pits(Hts) ≥
pits(Gˆ
t
s)
Hence, the SPoA, SPoAK , with respect to {pi(·)}i∈N is
upper bounded by
c(PˆK)
c(P) =
∑h
t=1
∑Kt
s=1 pits(Gˆ
t
s)∑h
t=1 c(Gt)
(15)
≤
∑h
t=1
∑Kt
s=1 pits(H
t
s)∑h
t=1 c(H
t
1)
(16)
≤ max
t∈{1,...,h}
∑Kt
s=1 pits(H
t
s)
c(Ht1)
≤ α({pi(·)}i∈N ) (17)
because α(·) is non-decreasing in K.
Note that [14] uses an approach called summability similar
to that of Lemma 1. Informally, a payment function (or cost-
sharing mechanism) pi(·) is said to be α-summable if for every
subset H of participants and every possible ordering σ on H ,
the sum of the payments of the participants as they are added
one-by-one according to σ is at most α · c(H). However,
[14] relies on the notion of cross-monotonicity for proving
summability. A payment function pi(·) is said to satisfy cross-
monotonicity, if for any G ⊆ G′, pi(G′) ≤ pi(G). [15] showed
that if a payment function satisfies cross-monotonicity in a
network cost-sharing game, then summability can bound the
price of anarchy. Also, cross-monotonicity implies that a Nash
equilibrium is a strong Nash equilibrium. Nonetheless, our
model is simpler than network cost-sharing games; Lemma 1
shows that α
({pi(·)}) can be used to bound SPoAK without
the assumption of cross-monotonicity. In particular, many
payment functions may violate cross-monotonicity (e.g., egal-
itarian, Nash bargaining solution, equal-split and proportional-
split), and hence, the approach in [14] will not apply to these
payment functions.
V. EQUAL-SPLIT COST-SHARING MECHANISM
Theorem 2. For equal-split cost-sharing, the SPoA is upper
bounded by
SPoAeqK ≤ HK = Θ(logK)
Proof. Applying Lemma 1 with pi = p
eq
i , we obtain
SPoAeqK ≤ α
({peqi (·)}i∈N ) (18)
= max
c(·), H1⊃···⊃HK
1
c(H1)
K∑
s=1
c(Hs)
K − s+ 1 (19)
≤
K∑
s=1
1
s
= HK (20)
which follows from the monotonicity of cost function,
c(Hs) ≤ c(H1).
A. Tight Example
We also present a tight example to show that SPoAeqK =
Θ(logK). There are K ·K! participants, indexed by
N = {its | t = 1, ...,K!, s = 1, ...,K}
For any non-empty subset G ⊆ N , we define the cost c(G)
as follows:
• Case 1: If G ⊆ {it1, ..., itK} for some t ∈ {1, ...,K}, then
we set c(G) = 1.
• Case 2: If G ⊆ {i(k−1)·(K−s+1)+1s , ..., ik·(K−s+1)s } for
some k ∈ {1, ..., K!K−s+1} and s ∈ {1, ...,K}, then we
set c(G) = 1.
• Case 3: Otherwise, c(G) = |G|.
It is evident that the preceding setting of cost function c(·)
satisfies monotonicity, because c(G) = 1 for cases 1 and 2,
otherwise c(G) = |G| ≥ |H| ≥ c(H) for all H ⊆ G. When
K = 3, the tight example is illustrated in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1: An illustration of tight example when K = 3,
where c({it1}) = c({it2}) = c({it3}) = 1, c({it1, it2, it3}) =
c({it1, it2}) = c({it2, it3}) = c({it1, it3}) = 1 for t = 1, ..., 6.
Also, c({i12, i22}) = c({i32, i42}) = c({i52, i62}) = 1 and
c({i11, i21, i31}) = c({i41, i51, i61}) = 1. The coalitions in orange
dotted lines {Gˆks} are a stable coalition structure, whereas the
coalitions in blue dashed lines {G∗t } are a social optimum.
Let Gˆks , {i(k−1)·(K−s+1)+1s , ..., ik·(K−s+1)s }, where s ∈
{1, ...,K}, k ∈ {1, ..., K!K−s+1}. And let G∗t , {it1, ..., itK},
where t = {1, ...,K!}. See an illustration in Fig. 1.
By equal-split cost-sharing, if its ∈ G, then
peqits
(G) =

1
|G| , if G ⊆ Gˆks
1
|G| , if G ⊆ G∗t
> 1|G| , otherwise
(21)
7Note that peqits (Gˆ
k
s) = p
eq
its
(G∗t \{it1, ..., its−1}) = 1K−s+1 .
Hence, it1 will not switch from coalition Gˆ
k
1 to G
∗
t . Neither
will its switch from coalition Gˆ
k
s to G
∗
t \{it1, ..., its−1}.
One can check that {Gˆks} are a stable coalition structure,
whereas {G∗t } are a social optimum. Hence, the SPoA is lower
bounded by
SPoAeqK ≥
∑K!
t=1
∑K
s=1 p
eq
its
(Gˆks)∑K!
t=1 c(G
∗
t )
=
K∑
s=1
1
K − s+ 1 = HK
(22)
B. Proportional-split Cost-Sharing Mechanism
Given cost function c(·), we define a truncated cost function
c˜(·) as follows:
c˜(G) ,
{
c(G), if c(G) ≤∑j∈G cj∑
j∈G cj , if c(G) >
∑
j∈G cj
(23)
Note that c˜(G) ≤∑j∈G cj for any G.
Let SPoAppK (c(·)) be the SPoA with respect to cost function
c(·) specifically.
Lemma 2. For proportional-split cost-sharing,
SPoAppK (c(·)) = SPoAppK (c˜(·)).
Proof. First, we show that if Pˆ is a stable coalition structure,
then for any G ∈ Pˆ , we have c(G) ≤∑j∈G cj . If we assume
c(G) >
∑
j∈G cj for some G ∈ Pˆ , then for all i ∈ G,
pppi (G) =
ci · c(G)∑
j∈G cj
> ci (24)
Namely, every i ∈ G can strictly reduce his payment by form-
ing a singleton coalition individually. This is a contradiction
to the fact that Pˆ is a stable coalition structure.
Second, we note that if P∗ is a social optimum, then for
any G ∈ P∗, we have c(G) ≤∑j∈G cj . Otherwise, P∗ does
not attain the least total cost by including G.
Therefore, we obtain c(Pˆ)c(P∗) =
c˜(Pˆ)
c˜(P∗) and SPoA
pp
K (c(·)) =
SPoAppK (c˜(·)).
Theorem 3. For proportional-split cost-sharing, the SPoA is
upper bounded by
SPoAppK ≤ logK + 2.
Proof. By Lemma 2 we may assume without loss of generality
that c(G) ≤ ∑j∈G cj for any G. Applying Lemma 1 with
pi = p
pp
i , we obtain
SPoAppK ≤ α
({pppi (·)}i∈N ) (25)
= max
c(·), H1⊃···⊃HK
1
c(H1)
K∑
s=1
pppis (Hs) (26)
where Hs = {is, ..., iK} for some i1, ..., iK ∈ N , with default
costs denoted by {cs, ..., cK}.
Since pppis (Hs) =
csc(Hs)∑K
t=s ct
, we obtain
SPoAppK ≤ max{cs,c(Hs)}Ks=1
1
c(H1)
K∑
s=1
csc(Hs)∑K
t=s ct
(27)
subject to c(H1) ≥ ... ≥ c(HK) and c(Hs) ≥
max{cs, ..., cK} (by monotonicity), and c(Hs) ≤
∑K
t=s ct (by
Lemma 2). Without loss of generality, we assume c(H1) = 1.
Hence, cs ≤ c(Hs) ≤ c(H1) = 1.
Let sˆ be the smallest integer, such that
∑K
t=sˆ+1 ct ≤ 1
(and hence
∑K
t=s ct > 1 for any s ≤ sˆ). If s ≥ sˆ, we
obtain csc(Hs)∑K
t=s ct
≤ cs by our assumption. If s < sˆ, we obtain
csc(Hs)∑K
t=s ct
≤ cs∑K
t=s ct
. Therefore,
SPoAppK ≤ max{cs}Ks=1
( K∑
s=sˆ
cs +
sˆ−1∑
s=1
cs∑K
t=s ct
)
(28)
≤ 2 +
sˆ−1∑
s=1
cs∑K
t=s ct
≤ 2 + logK (29)
which follows from Lemma 3 and csˆ ≤ 1.
Note that one can strengthen the SPoA by SPoAppK ≤ HK
for K ≤ 6. We can apply the same tight example in Sec. V-A
to show that SPoAppK = Θ(logK) because p
pp
i (G) = p
eq
i (G)
in this example.
Lemma 3. If 0 ≤ cs ≤ 1 for all s ∈ {1, ...,K} and∑K
s=sˆ cs ≥ 1 for some sˆ ≤ K, then
sˆ−1∑
s=1
cs∑K
t=s ct
≤ logK
Proof. First, since 1x+y ≤ 1x+δ for any positive numbers
x, y, δ, such that δ ≤ y, we obtain
y
x+ y
≤
∫ y
0
1
x+ δ
dδ = log(x+ y)− log x (30)
It follows that
cs∑K
t=s ct
≤ log(
K∑
t=s
ct)− log(
K∑
t=s+1
ct) (31)
Hence,
sˆ−1∑
s=1
cs∑K
t=s ct
≤ log(
K∑
s=1
cs)− log(
K∑
s=sˆ
cs) (32)
≤ logK − log(1) = logK (33)
because
∑K
s=1 cs ≤ K and
∑K
s=sˆ cs ≥ 1.
VI. BARGAINING BASED COST-SHARING MECHANISMS
First, we show that the SPoA for egalitarian bargaining
solution and Nash bargaining solution (irrespective of the
constraint of non-negative payments) are equivalent. However,
there is a difficulty, when we apply Lemma 1 to obtain an up-
per bound for the SPoA – we can only obtain an upper bound
as O(K) by the payment function of egalitarian bargaining
solution, whereas the payment function of Nash bargaining
solution under the constraint of non-negative payments is
not convenient to analyze. But we show a property in Nash
bargaining solution, namely that there always exists a coalition
structure that satisfies positive payments and its cost is at most
(
√
K + 1) from that of a given coalition structure. We then
obtain an upper bound as O(
√
K logK) for the SPoA using
this property.
8A. Equivalence between Egalitarian and Nash Bargaining
Lemma 4. If the constraint of non-negative payments is
not considered in Nash bargaining solution, then egalitarian
and Nash bargaining solutions are equivalent: pegai (G) =
pnashi (G).
Proof. This follows from the fact that the feasible set of
Nash bargaining solutions is bounded by the hyperplane∑
i∈G ui =
∑
i∈G ci − c(G). The maximal of
∏
i∈G ui (i.e.,
Nash bargaining solution) is attained at the point ui = uj for
any i, j ∈ G.
Lemma 5. For Nash bargaining solution (irrespective of the
constraint of non-negative payments), given a stable coalition
structure Pˆ ∈ PK and G ∈ Pˆ , then every participant has
non-negative payment: pnashi (G) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ G.
Namely, each stable coalition structure with the constraint
of non-negative payments coincides with a stable coalition
structure without the constraint of non-negative payments.
Proof. Consider a coalition G = {i1, ..., iK} ∈ Pˆ , with
default costs denoted by {c1, ..., cK}. We prove the statement
by contradiction. Assume that pnashis (G) < 0 for some is ∈ G.
Then,
cs <
∑
j∈G cj − c(G)
|G| ⇒ cs <
∑
j∈G:j 6=is cj − c(G)
|G| − 1 (34)
Thus, we obtain∑
j∈G cj − c(G)
|G| =
cs +
∑
j∈G:j 6=is cj − c(G)
|G| (35)
<
( 1|G|−1 + 1)
(∑
j∈G:j 6=is cj − c(G)
)
|G| (36)
=
∑
j∈G:j 6=is cj − c(G)
|G| − 1 (37)
≤
∑
j∈G:j 6=is cj − c(G\{is})
|G| − 1 (38)
where c(G\{is}) ≤ c(G) by monotonicity of the cost func-
tion. For any ik 6= is,
pnashik (G\{is}) = ck −
∑
j∈G:j 6=is cj − c(G\{is})
|G| − 1 (39)
< ck −
∑
j∈G cj − c(G)
|G| = p
nash
ik
(G) (40)
Namely, all users in G\{is} would reduce strictly their pay-
ments by switching to the coalition G\{is}. This is a contra-
diction to the fact that Pˆ is a stable coalition structure.
Corollary 1. For egalitarian bargaining solution and Nash
bargaining solution (irrespective of the constraint of non-
negative payments), their SPoA are equivalent:
SPoAegaK = SPoA
nash
K
Proof. This follows from Lemma 4 and Lemma 5.
Given cost function c(·), we define a truncated cost function
c˜(·) by Eqn. (23) in Sec. V-B, such that c˜(G) ≤∑j∈G cj for
any G.
Lemma 6. For egalitarian and Nash bargaining solutions
(irrespective of the constraint of non-negative payments), we
obtain
SPoAegaK (c(·)) = SPoAnashK (c(·))
= SPoAegaK (c˜(·)) = SPoAnashK (c˜(·)).
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 2. First, we show
that if Pˆ is a stable coalition structure, then for any G ∈ Pˆ ,
we obtain c(G) ≤ ∑t∈G ct based on a contradiction. If we
assume c(G) >
∑
t∈G ct for some G ∈ Pˆ , then for all i ∈ G,
pegai (G) = ci −
(
∑
t∈G ct)− c(G)
|G| > ci (41)
This is a contradiction, since Pˆ cannot be a stable coalition
structure. Second, we note that if P∗ is a social optimum,
then for any G ∈ P∗, we obtain c(G) ≤∑t∈G ct. Therefore,
by Corollary 1, we obtain SPoAegaK (c(·)) = SPoAnashK (c(·)) =
SPoAegaK (c˜(·)) = SPoAnashK (c˜(·)).
B. Bounding Strong Price of Anarchy
Theorem 4. For egalitarian bargaining solution and Nash
bargaining solution (irrespective of the constraint of non-
negative payments), the SPoA is upper bounded by
SPoAegaK = SPoA
nash
K = O(
√
K logK) (42)
Proof. First, by Lemma 6, it suffices to consider egalitarian
bargaining solution with cost function satisfying c(G) ≤∑
j∈G cj for any G.
Next, by Lemma 8, there exists a coalition structure P˜ ,
such that pnashi (G) > 0 for all i ∈ G ∈ P˜ , and c(P˜) ≤
(
√
K + 1) · c(P∗K), where P∗K is a social optimum. For a
stable coalition structure PˆK ,
c(PˆK)
c(P∗K)
≤ (
√
K + 1) · c(PˆK)
c(P˜)
Let P˜ = {G1, ..., Gh}, We apply the similar argument of
Lemma 1 to obtain that for any t ∈ {1, ..., h} and s ∈
{1, ...,Kt}, there exists Gˆts ∈ PˆK , such that its ∈ Gˆts and
pits(H
t
s) ≥ pits(Gˆts). Therefore,
c(PˆK)
c(P˜) =
∑h
t=1
∑Kt
s=1 p
ega
its
(Gˆts)∑h
t=1 c(Gt)
(43)
≤
∑h
t=1
∑Kt
s=1 p
ega
its
(Hts)∑h
t=1 c(H
t
1)
≤ α({pegai (·)}) (44)
Hence, SPoAegaK ≤ (
√
K + 1) · α({pegai (·)}).
Let Hs = {is, ..., iK}, with the default costs denoted
by {cs, ..., cK}. Recall that egalitarian bargaining solution is
given by
pegais (Hs) = cs −
(
∑K
t=s ct)− c(Hs)
K − s+ 1
subject to c(H1) ≥ ... ≥ c(HK) and c(Hs) ≥
max{cs, ..., cK} (by monotonicity), and c(Hs) ≤
∑K
t=s ct (by
Lemma 6). Finally, it follows that SPoAeqaK ≤ O(
√
K logK)
by Lemma 10.
9We can apply the same tight example in Sec. V-A to show
that SPoAegaK = SPoA
nash
K ≥ Θ(logK) because pegai (G) =
peqi (G) in this example.
Lemma 7. ( [21] Theorem 2) Consider a coalition G =
{i1, ..., iK}, with corresponding default costs denoted by
{c1, ..., cK}, such that c1 ≥ c2 ≥ ... ≥ cK . If the constraint
of non-negative payments is considered, then Nash bargaining
solution can be expressed by
pnashis (G) =
{
cs − (
∑m
t=1 ct)−c(G)
m , if s ≤ m
0, otherwise
where m is the largest integer such that cm >
(
∑m−1
t=1 ct)−c(G)
m−1 .
Lemma 8. Suppose c(G) ≤ ∑j∈G cj for any G. Given any
coalition structure P ∈PK , there exists a coalition structure
P˜ ∈ PK , such that pnashi (G) > 0 for all i ∈ G ∈ P˜ , and
c(P˜) ≤ (√K + 1) · c(P).
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 10. Let bs , c(Hs). Consider the following maxi-
mization problem:
(M1) y∗(K) , max
{cs,bs}Ks=1
K∑
s=1
(
cs − (
∑K
t=s ct)− bs
K − s+ 1
)
(45)
subject to
bs ≤
K∑
t=s
ct, for all s = 1, ...,K − 1, (46)
0 ≤ cs ≤ bs ≤ bs+1 ≤ 1, for all s = 1, ...,K, (47)
b1 +Kcs −
K∑
t=1
ct ≥ 0, for all s = 1, ...,K (48)
The maximum of (M1) is upper bounded by y∗(K) ≤ 1 +
HK−1 = O(logK).
In Lemma 10, constraint (48) captures positive payment for
every participant in H1.
Proof. See Appendix.
VII. USAGE BASED COST-SHARING MECHANISM
Recall that r(G) is the lowest cost canonical resource for
G, and Fi(r(G)) is the set of facilities utilized by participant
i ∈ G in canonical resource r(G). First, for each subset L ⊆
G, we define
XG(L) ,
∑
f∈
(⋂
i∈LFi(r(G))
)∖(⋃
i∈G\LFi(r(G))
) cf (49)
Namely, XG(L) is the total cost of facilities of canonical
resource r(G) that are only used by the coalition L exclusively.
See Fig. 2 for an illustration of XG(L).
Usage based payment function can be reformulated as
pubi (G) =
∑
L⊆G:i∈L
XG(L)
|L| (50)
Fig. 2: Consider G = {i1, i2, i3}. The three circles depict the
sets Fi1(r(G)),Fi2(r(G)),Fi3(r(G)). If c
f is represented
by a unit area, then XG(L) is the intersection area of L.
Given a set of participants {i1, ...iK} and Hs , {is, ..., iK},
we simply write Xs(L) , XHs(L).
In general, the strong price of anarchy of usage based cost-
sharing can be Ω(K).
Theorem 5. For usage based cost-sharing in general settings,
there exists an instance, such that
SPoAubK = Ω(K).
Proof. See Appendix.
A. Monotone Utilization
Generally SPoAubK = Ω(K), but we next present a general
sufficient condition for inducing SPoAubK = Θ(logK). The set
of facilities utilized by participants Fi(·) are said to satisfy
monotone utilization, if for all H ⊆ G,∑
f∈∪i∈HFi(r(H))
cf ≤
∑
f∈∪i∈HFi(r(G))
cf (51)
Namely, the total cost of facilities utilized by a subset of
participants increases in a larger coalition. Note that monotone
utilization condition implies monotonicity of cost function.
For hotel room sharing problem, a set of days of a par-
ticipant stays in a room booking does not depend on the
coalition, and hence, Fi(r(H)) = Fi(r(G)). For taxi-ride
sharing problem, one needs to travel a greater distance in order
to pick-up and drop-off other passengers when sharing with
more passengers, and hence, monotone utilization condition
is satisfied. Although pass sharing problem does not generally
satisfy monotone utilization condition, we will later prove that
the SPoA for pass sharing problem with uniform average cost
is also Θ(logK).
Theorem 6. Consider usage based cost-sharing, such that
Fi(·) satisfies the monotone utilization condition. Then
SPoAubK ≤ HK = Θ(logK). (52)
Proof. See Appendix.
We can apply the same tight example in Sec. V-A to show
that SPoAubK = Θ(logK). We set XG(L) = 1 when L = G,
otherwise XG(L) = 0. This can satisfy monotone utilization
condition. It follows that pubi (G) = p
eq
i (G) in this example.
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B. Pass Sharing
Pass sharing problem violates monotone utilization condi-
tion. But we can bound the SPoA for pass sharing problem
with uniform average cost cf = 1.
Theorem 7. Consider usage based cost-sharing for pass
sharing problem with uniform average cost cf = 1. Then
SPoAubK ≤ HK + 1 = Θ(logK) (53)
Proof. See Appendix.
VIII. EXISTENCE OF STABLE COALITION STRUCTURES
This section completes the study by investigating the exis-
tence of stable coalition structures considering different cost-
sharing mechanisms. First, we define a cyclic preference as
sequences (i1, ..., is) and (G1, ..., Gs), where ik ∈ Gk∩Gk+1
for all k ≤ s− 1, and is ∈ Gs ∩G1, such that
ui1(pi1(G1)) > ui1(pi1(G2)),
ui2(pi2(G2)) > ui2(pi2(G3)),
...
uis(pis(Gs)) > uis(pis(G1))
Lemma 11. If there exists no cyclic preference, there always
exists a stable coalition structure. Furthermore, such a stable
coalition structure can be found in time nO(K).
Proof. See Appendix.
By Lemma 11, we can show that there always exists a
stable coalition structure for equal-split, proportional-split cost
sharing mechanisms, egalitarian bargaining solution and Nash
bargaining solution. See Appendix for full proofs. In general,
usage based cost-sharing can induce cyclic preference, and
hence, possibly the absence of a stable coalition structure.
However, we show the existence of a stable coalition structure
in some special cases, for example, pass sharing problem and
hotel room sharing problem when K = 2 (see Appendix).
IX. CONCLUSION
Sharing economy is a popular paradigm for social and eco-
nomic interactions with distributed decision-making processes.
Motivated by the applications of sharing economy, this paper
studies a coalition formation game with a constraint on the
maximum number of sharing participants per each coalition.
This coalition formation game can capture a number applica-
tions of sharing economy, such as hotel room, taxi-ride and
pass sharing problems. A number of cost-sharing mechanisms
are considered, wherein each participant is interested in joining
a coalition with a lower payment in the respective cost-sharing
mechanism. We study stable coalitions, wherein no coalition
of participants can deviate unilaterally to form lower cost
coalitions, as the likely self-interested outcomes.
To quantify the inefficiency of distributed decision-making
processes, we show that the Strong Price of Anarchy (SPoA)
between a worst-case stable coalition and the social optimum
for egalitarian and Nash solutions is O(
√
K logK), whereas
the one for equal-split, proportional-split, and usage based
cost-sharing (under monotone consumption condition or for
pass sharing problem) is only Θ(logK), where K is the max-
imum capacity of sharing participants. Therefore, distributed
decision-making processes under common fair cost-sharing
mechanisms induce only moderate inefficiency.
The SPoA for egalitarian and Nash solutions (i.e.,
O(
√
K logK)) is not known to be tight. It is interesting
to see if the gap will be closed. Furthermore, the SPoA
for specific problems (e.g., hotel room, taxi-ride and pass
sharing problems) may be strictly smaller than Θ(logK). A
companion study of empirical SPoA for taxi-ride sharing using
real-world taxi data can be found in [22].
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APPENDIX
A. Monotone Property of α(·)
We show that α(·) is non-decreasing in K. Recall that
αK
({pi(·)}i∈N ) , max
c(·), H1⊃···⊃HK
∑K
s=1 pis(Hs)
c(H1)
, (54)
where H1, ...,HK are a collection of subsets, such that each
Hs , {is, ..., iK} for some i1, ..., iK ∈ N . We explicitly
use subscript K to denote the dependence of K. For brevity,
consider K = K ′ + 1. Suppose
αK′ =
∑K′
s=1 pis(Hs)
c(H1)
(55)
for a cost function c(·) and some subsets H1, ...,HK′ , where
|H1| = K ′. Then we construct a new set H1 ∪ {i} for some
element i, and let c(H1 ∪ {i}) = c(H1) (which still satisfies
monotonicity). Then
αK ≥ pi(H1 ∪ {i}) +
∑K′
s=1 pis(Hs)
c(H1 ∪ {i}) ≥ αK
′
because pi(·) is non-negative.
B. Bargaining Based Cost-Sharing Mechanisms
Lemma 7. ( [21] Theorem 2) Consider a coalition G =
{i1, ..., iK}, with corresponding default costs denoted by
{c1, ..., cK}, such that c1 ≥ c2 ≥ ... ≥ cK . If the constraint
of non-negative payments is considered, then Nash bargaining
solution can be expressed by
pnashis (G) =
{
cs − (
∑m
t=1 ct)−c(G)
m , if s ≤ m
0, otherwise
where m is the largest integer such that cm >
(
∑m−1
t=1 ct)−c(G)
m−1 .
Lemma 8. Suppose c(G) ≤ ∑j∈G cj for any G. Given any
coalition structure P ∈PK , there exists a coalition structure
P˜ ∈ PK , such that pnashi (G) > 0 for all i ∈ G ∈ P˜ , and
c(P˜) ≤ (√K + 1) · c(P).
Proof. Given coalition structure P , we construct coalition
structure P˜ as follows. For each G ∈ P , we sort the
participants G = {i1, ..., im} in the decreasing order of their
default costs, such that c1 ≥ c2 ≥ ... ≥ cm. We next split
G into R sub-groups {N1, ..., NR}, where i1, ..., im1 ∈ N1,
im1+1, ..., im2 ∈ N2, · · · , imR−1+1, ..., imR ∈ NR, such that
for k = mt−1 + 1, ...,mt
ck −
∑k
l=mt−1+1 cl − c({imt−1+1, ..., ik})
k −mt−1 > 0 (56)
cimt+1 −
∑mt
l=mt−1+1 cl − c({imt−1+1, ..., imt+1})
mt −mt−1 ≤ 0 (57)
where t ∈ {1, ..., R} and m0 = 0. By monotonicity of c(·) and
the ordering on ci, Eqns. (56)-(57) imply that each ik ∈ Nt
satisfies
ck −
∑mt+1
l=mt−1 cl − c(Nt)
mt −mt−1 > 0,
and
ck −
∑mt−1
l=mt−2+1 cl − c(Nt−1)
mt−1 −mt−2 ≤ 0
By Lemma 7, the above conditions can guarantee positive
payments in Nash bargaining solution. We then replace each
coalition G ∈ P by a collection of coalitions N1, ..., NR. We
call such a coalition structure P˜ .
Note that for each ik ∈ Nt+1,
ck ≤
∑mt
l=mt−1+1 cl − c(Nt)
mt −mt−1 ≤
ntcmt−1+1 − c(Nt)
nt
(58)
where nt , |Nt| = mt − mt−1. Without loss of generality,
we assume c(G) = 1. Let c¯t , cmt−1+1 and Ct , c(Nt). It
is evident to see that 1 ≥ c¯1 > c¯2 > ... > c¯R > 0. Since
c(G) ≤∑j∈G cj for any G, Ct ≤ ntc¯t for all t ∈ {1, ...,K}.
We next upper bound
∑R
t=1 Ct by the following optimiza-
tion problem (S1):
(S1) max
(Ct,nt)Rt=1
R∑
t=1
Ct (59)
subject to 0 ≤ Ct ≤ 1, for all t ∈ {1, ..., R} (60)
R∑
t=1
nt ≤ K (61)
Ct ≤ nt(c¯t − c¯t+1), for all t ∈ {1, ..., R}, (62)
where we assume c¯R+1 = 0. Since in (S1) the lower bounds
on nt are only present in Constraints (62), we assume nt =
Ct
yt
, where yt , c¯t − c¯t+1 for t = 1, ..., R, and obtain
(S2) max
(Ct)Rt=1
R∑
t=1
Ct (63)
subject to 0 ≤ Ct ≤ 1, for all t ∈ {1, ..., R} (64)
R∑
t=1
Ct
yt
≤ K (65)
Note that (S2) is simply a fractional knapsack problem.
Suppose that (yt)Rt=1 are arranged in a non-increasing order,
y1 ≥ y2 ≥ · · · ≥ yR. Let ` be the largest index such that∑`
t=1
1
yt
≤ K and
R∑
t=`+1
1
yt
> K (66)
Then the optimal solution (C∗t )
R
t=1 to (S2) is given by
Lemma 9. Hence, the optimal value of (S2) is
∑R
t=1 C
∗
t ≤
`+ 1. Note that
R∑
t=1
yt =
R∑
t=1
(c¯t − c¯t+1) = c¯1 ≤ 1 (67)
By the arithmetic mean-harmonic mean inequality (i.e.,∑`
t=1
yt
` ≥ `∑`
t=1
1
yt
), we obtain
`
K
≤ `∑`
t=1
1
yt
≤
∑`
t=1
yt
`
≤ 1
`
(68)
Hence, it follows that ` ≤ √K, and the maximum of (S2) is
upper bounded by
√
K + 1.
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Therefore, this completes the proof by
∑
G∈P
R∑
t=1
c(Nt) ≤
∑
G∈P
(
√
K+1)·c(G) ⇒ c(P˜) ≤ (
√
K+1)·c(P).
(69)
Lemma 9. The fractional knapsack problem is defined by
(FKP) max
(Ct)Rt=1
R∑
t=1
Ct (70)
subject to 0 ≤ Ct ≤ 1, for all t ∈ {1, ..., R} (71)
R∑
t=1
Ct
yt
≤ K (72)
Suppose that (yt)Rt=1 are positive and arranged in a non-
increasing order, y1 ≥ y2 ≥ · · · ≥ yR. Let ` be the largest
index such that∑`
t=1
1
yt
≤ K and
R∑
t=`+1
1
yt
> K (73)
Then the optimal solution (C∗t )
R
t=1 to (FKP) is given by
C∗t =

1, if t ∈ {1, ..., `},
min{K −∑`j=1 1yj , 1}, if t = `+ 1,
0, if t ∈ {`+ 2, ..., R}
Proof. The proof follows from a well-known result in knap-
sack problem (for example, see [23] Theorem 2.2.1).
Lemma 10. Let bs , c(Hs). Consider the following maxi-
mization problem.
(M1) y∗(K) , max
{cs,bs}Ks=1
K∑
s=1
(
cs − (
∑K
t=s ct)− bs
K − s+ 1
)
(74)
subject to
bs ≤
K∑
t=s
ct, for all s ∈ {1, ...,K − 1}, (75)
0 ≤ cs ≤ bs ≤ bs+1 ≤ 1, for all s ∈ {1, ...,K}, (76)
b1 +Kcs −
K∑
t=1
ct ≥ 0, for all s ∈ {1, ...,K}. (77)
The maximum is upper bounded by y∗(K) ≤ 1 +∑K−1s=1 1s =
O(logK).
Proof. Clearly, it is enough to bound (M1) subject to the
relaxation:
0 ≤ cs ≤ bs ≤ bs+1 ≤ 1, for all s ∈ {1, ...,K}, (78)
b1 +Kcs −
K∑
t=1
ct ≥ 0, for all s ∈ {1, ...,K}. (79)
As the coefficients of bs in (M1) are positive, it is clear that
setting bs = 1, for all s, will maximize (M1) without violating
the Constraints (78) and (79). It is then enough to show that
the optimum value z∗ of the following linear program is at
most 1− 1K .
z∗ , max
cs
K∑
s=1
(K − s+ 1)cs −
∑K
t=s ct
K − s+ 1 (80)
subject to
max
{
0,
∑K
t=1 ct − 1
K
}
≤ cs ≤ 1, for all s ∈ {1, ...,K}.
(81)
We write
f(c1, ..., cK) ,
K∑
s=1
(K − s+ 1)cs −
∑K
t=s ct
K − s+ 1 (82)
=
K∑
s=1
csαs, (83)
where αs , 1−
∑s
t=1
1
K−t+1 . Denote by c
∗
s , for s = 1, ...,K,
the optimal values maximizing f(c1, ..., cK) subject to the
constraints given in Eqn. (81). Note that
K∑
s=1
αs = K −
K∑
s=1
s∑
t=1
1
K − s+ 1 (84)
= K −
K∑
t=1
1
K − s+ 1
K∑
s=t
1 = 0 (85)
Claim 1. Let (c1, ..., cK) 6= 0 be a basic feasible solution
(BFS) of LP Eqn. (80). Then, there exists a partition S1∪So of
[K] such that and cs = 1 for all s ∈ S1, and cs = c¯ , K−h−1K−h
for all s ∈ So, where h , |So| ≤ K − 1.
Proof. A BFS (c1, ..., cK) of the LP Eqn. (80) is determined
by exactly K equations among the inequalities in Eqn. (81).
We first note that we must have max
{
0,
∑K
t=1 ct−1
K
}
=∑K
t=1 ct−1
K ; otherwise,
∑K
t=1 ct < 1 implies that cs = 0 for
all s (since the inequalities in Eqn. (81) in this case reduce to
0 ≤ cs ≤ 1 and the BFS will pick one of these two inequalities
for each s).
Let S1 , {s : cs = 1} and So , {s : cs =
∑K
t=1 ct−1
K },
and note that S1 ∪ So = {1, ...,K}. Write x ,
∑K
t=1 ct−1
K =
hx+K−h−1
K . Then x = c¯.
Let (c1, ..., cK) be a BFS of Eqn. (81) defined by the
partition So∪S1. Then substituting the value of cs in Eqn. (82)
and using Eqn. (84) we obtain
f(c1, ..., cK) = c¯
∑
s∈So
αs +
∑
s∈S1
αs
= (1− c¯)
∑
i∈S1
αs =
∑
s∈S1 αs
|S1| (86)
Note that αs > αs+1 for all s = 1, ...,K − 1. It follows that
the choice S1 = {1} maximizes f(c1, ..., cK) and the lemma
follows.
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C. Usage Based Cost-Sharing Mechanism
Theorem 5. For usage based cost-sharing in general settings,
there exists an instance, such that
SPoAubK = Ω(K).
Proof. We construct a similar instance to the one in Sec. V-A.
There are K · K! participants, indexed by N = {its | t =
1, ...,K, s = 1, ...,K!}. For any non-empty subset G ⊆ N
and L ⊆ G, we define XG(L) as follows:
• Case 1: If G ⊆ {it1, ..., itK} for some t ∈ {1, ...,K}, then
– If |G| = 1, then XG(L) = 1.
– If |G| > 1, then let s = min{s′ | its′ ∈ G}, and
XG(L) =

1
2 , if L = {its}
1
2 , if L = G\{its}
0, otherwise
(87)
See an illustration of an example for setting XG(L) in
Fig. 3.
Fig. 3: An illustration of an example for setting
XG(L) in case 1. Suppose s′′ < s′ < s.
X{its}
({its}) = 1, X{its,its′}({its}) = X{its,its′}({its′}) =
X{its,its′ ,its′′}
({its′′}) = X{its,its′ ,its′′}({its, its′}) = 12 .
Otherwise, XG(L) = 0.
• Case 2: If G ⊆ {i(k−1)·(K−s+1)+1s , ..., ik·(K−s+1)s } for
some k ∈ {1, ..., K!K−s+1} and s ∈ {1, ...,K}, then
XG(L) =
{
1, if L = G
0, otherwise
(88)
• Case 3: Otherwise, G is a partition of m sets G = H1 ∪
· · ·∪Hm, where each Ht is a maximal subset that satisfies
either Case 1 or Case 2. Then,
XG(L) =
m∑
s=1
XHs(L ∩Hs) (89)
Let Gˆks , {i(k−1)·(K−s+1)+1s , ..., ik·(K−s+1)s }, where s ∈
{1, ...,K}, k ∈ {1, ..., K!K−s+1}. And let G∗t , {it1, ..., itK},
where t ∈ {1, ...,K!}. One can check that {Gˆks} form a stable
coalition structure, whereas {G∗t } are a social optimum. Note
that if Hts = {its, ..., itK}, then
pubits (H
t
s) ≥
1
2
(90)
Therefore, the price of anarchy is lower bounded by
SPoAubK ≥
∑K!
t=1
∑K
s=1 p
ub
its
(Hts)∑K!
t=1 c(H
t
1)
≥ K
2
(91)
Theorem 6. Consider usage based cost-sharing, such that
Fi(·) satisfies the monotone utilization condition. Then
SPoAubK ≤ HK = Θ(logK). (92)
Proof. Applying Lemma 1 with pi = pubi , we obtain
SPoAubK ≤ α
({pubi (·)}i∈N ) = max
c(·), H1⊃···⊃HK
1
c(H1)
K∑
s=1
pubis (Hs)
where Hs = {is, ..., iK}, with the corresponding default costs
denoted by {cs, ..., cK}. Without loss of generality, we assume
c(H1) = 1. Recall that Xs(L) , XHs(L) and pubis (Hs) =∑
L⊆Hs:is∈L
Xs(L)
|L| .
Note that the monotone utilization condition is equivalent
to saying that, for all s ∈ {1, ...,K − 1} and K ≥ t > s,∑
L⊆Ht
Xt(L) ≤
∑
L⊆Hs:L∩Ht 6=∅
Xs(L) (93)
Hence, we can bound SPoAubK by the maximum value of the
linear optimization problem (P1):
(P1) max
{Xs(·)}Ks=1
K∑
s=1
∑
L⊆Hs:is∈L
Xs(L)
|L| (94)
subject to∑
L⊆Ht
Xt(L) ≤
∑
L⊆Hs:L∩Ht 6=∅
Xs(L),
for all 1 ≤ s < t ≤ K, (95)∑
L⊆H1
X1(L) ≤ 1, for all s ∈ {1, ...,K}, (96)
Xs(L) ≥ 0, for all s ∈ {1, ...,K}, L ⊆ Hs (97)
For s ∈ {1, ...,K} and L ⊆ Hs, we define
ρ(L, s) ,
{
1
|L| , if is ∈ L,
0, otherwise
(98)
Then the dual problem to (P1) can be written as follows:
(D1) min
λ(·),z
z (99)
subject to
t−1∑
s=1
λ(s, t)−
∑
t+1≤s≤K:L∩Hs 6=∅
λ(t, s) ≥ ρ(L, t),
for all t ∈ {2, ...,K}, L ⊆ Ht, (100)
ρ(L, 1) +
∑
2≤s≤K:L∩Hs 6=∅
λ(1, s) ≤ z, for all L ⊆ H1,
(101)
λ(s, t) ≥ 0, for all 1 ≤ s < t ≤ K, z ≥ 0 (102)
We next provide a primal-dual feasible pair (X∗, λ∗) whose
objective value is
∑K
s=1
1
s . To better understand this proof, it
may be instructive to look at the example when K = 3 in
Table II.
Primal solution:
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For s ∈ {1, ...,K} and L ⊆ Hs, we set
X∗s (L) ,
{
1, if L = Hs,
0, otherwise
(103)
For s ∈ {1, ...,K − 1}, s < t ≤ K, we obtain
1 =X∗t (Ht) =
∑
L⊆Ht
X∗t (L) (104)
=X∗s (Hs) =
∑
L⊆Hs:L∩Ht 6=∅
X∗s (L) (105)
Also, we obtain ∑
L⊆H1
X∗1 (L) = X
∗
1 (H1) = 1 (106)
Hence, X∗ satisfies Constraint (95) and Constraint (96).
Dual solution:
We first claim that there is a set of numbers λ∗(s, t) ≥ 0,
for 1 ≤ s < t ≤ K that satisfy Constraint (100) as equalities.
To show this, we study the linear optimization problem (D2):
(D2) min
λ(·)
∑
1≤s<t≤K
λ(s, t) (107)
subject to
t−1∑
s=1
λ(s, t)−
∑
t+1≤s≤K:L∩Hs 6=∅
λ(t, s) = ρ(L, t),
for all t ∈ {2, ...,K}, L ⊆ Ht, (108)
λ(s, t) ≥ 0, for all 1 ≤ s < t ≤ K (109)
and its dual:
(P2) max
Xs(·)
K∑
s=2
∑
L⊆Hs:is∈L
Xs(L)
|L| (110)
subject to∑
L⊆Ht
Xt(L) ≤
∑
L⊆Hs:L∩Ht 6=∅
Xs(L) + 1,
for all 1 < s < t ≤ K, (111)∑
L⊆Htu
Xt(L) ≤ 1, for all 1 < t ≤ K (112)
By Constraint (112), the primal problem (P2) is bounded;
it is also feasible since X∗s (L) for s ∈ {2, ...,K} given in
Eqn. (103) satisfies Constraint (111) and Constraint (112). It
follows that the dual (D2) is also feasible and bounded, that
is, there exist numbers λ∗(s, t) satisfying Constraint (108).
Let z∗ =
∑K
s=1
1
s . We claim that (λ
∗, z∗) is a feasible
solution to the dual problem Eqn. (99). Evidently, we need
only to check that it satisfies Constraint (101).
For L ⊆ H1, we sum the equations in Constraint (108) for
L ∩Ht for all t ∈ {2, ...,K} to obtain
K∑
t=2
ρ(L ∩Ht, t) (113)
=
K∑
t=2
t−1∑
s=1
λ∗(s, t)−
K∑
t=2
∑
t+1≤s≤K:L∩Hs 6=∅
λ∗(t, s) (114)
≥
K∑
t=2
t−1∑
s=1
λ∗(s, t)−
K∑
t=2
K∑
s=t+1
λ∗(t, s) (115)
=
K−1∑
s=1
K∑
t=s+1
λ∗(s, t)−
K∑
t=2
K∑
s=t+1
λ∗(t, s) (116)
=
K∑
s=2
λ∗(1, s) (117)
It follows that
ρ(L, 1) +
K∑
s=2
λ∗(1, s) ≤
K∑
t=1
ρ(L ∩Ht, t) (118)
=
∑
1≤t≤K:it∈L
1
|L ∩Ht| =
|L|∑
t=1
1
t
≤ z∗ (119)
Hence, Constraint (101) is satisfied.
Optimality:
Finally, the proof is completed by noting that
K∑
s=1
∑
L⊆Hs:is∈L
X∗s (L)
|L| =
K∑
s=1
1
|Hs| = z
∗ (120)
Theorem 7. Consider usage based cost-sharing for pass
sharing problem with uniform average cost cf = 1. Then
SPoAubK ≤ HK + 1 = Θ(logK). (121)
Proof. Recall that Ti is the a set of required usage timeslots
of user i, Tr is the set allowable timeslots of pass r, and
Fi(r(G)) = Ti∪
(
Tr\(
⋃
j∈G Tj)
)
. For pass sharing problem,
we note that XG(L) = 0 if 1 < |L| < |G|. Hence,
pubi (G) =
XG(G)
|G| +XG({i}) (122)
Since the average cost cf = 1, XG({i}) = |Ti|, and XG(G) =
|Tr\(
⋃
j∈G Tj)|.
Let Hs , {is, ..., iK} and Xˆ , maxs∈{1,...,K}Xs(Hs).
Applying Lemma 1 with pi = pubi , we obtain
SPoAubK ≤ max
c(·), H1⊃···⊃HK
1
c(H1)
( K∑
s=1
( Xˆ
|Hs| + |Tis |
))
(123)
Note that Xˆ ≤ c(H1) because of monotonicity of cost
function, and
∑K
s=1 |Tis | ≤ c(H1), because the coalition of
users H1 = {i1, ..., iK} cannot overlap in their required usage
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(P1) max X1({1}) + X1({1,2})2 +
X1({1,3})
2 +
X1({1,2,3})
3 +X2({2}) +
X2({2,3})
2 +X3({3})
subject to
λ(1, 2) : X2({2}) +X2({3}) +X2({2, 3}) ≤ X1({2}) +X1({3}) +X1({1, 2}) +X1({1, 3}) +X1({2, 3}) +X1({1, 2, 3})
λ(1, 3) : X3({3}) ≤ X1({3}) +X1({1, 3}) +X1({2, 3}) +X1({1, 2, 3})
λ(2, 3) : X3({3}) ≤ X2({3}) +X2({2, 3})
z : X1({1}) +X1({2}) +X1({3}) +X1({1, 2}) +X1({1, 3}) +X1({2, 3}) +X1({1, 2, 3}) ≤ 1
X1({1}), X1({2}), X1({3}), X1({1, 2}), X1({1, 3}), X1({2, 3}) ≥ 0,
X1({1, 2, 3}), X2({2}), X2({3}), X2({2, 3}), X3({3}) ≥ 0
(D1) min z
subject to
X2({2}) : λ(1, 2) ≥ 1
X2({3}) : λ(1, 2)− λ(2, 3) ≥ 0
X2({2, 3}) : λ(1, 2)− λ(2, 3) ≥ 12
X3({3}) : λ(1, 3) + λ(2, 3) ≥ 1
X1({1}) : 1 ≤ z
X1({2}) : λ(1, 2) ≤ z
X1({3}) : λ(1, 2) + λ(1, 3) ≤ z
X1({1, 2}) : 12 + λ(1, 2) ≤ z
X1({1, 3}) : 12 + λ(1, 2) + λ({3}, 1, 3) ≤ z
X1({2, 3}) : λ(1, 2) + λ(1, 3) ≤ z
X1({1, 2, 3}) : 13 + λ(1, 2) + λ(1, 3) ≤ z
λ(1, 2), λ(1, 3), λ(2, 3) ≥ 0
(D2) min λ(1, 2) + λ(1, 3) + λ(2, 3)
subject to
X2({2}) : λ(1, 2) = 1
X2({3}) : λ(1, 2)− λ(2, 3) = 0
X2({2, 3}) : λ(1, 2)− λ(2, 3) = 12
X3({3}) : λ(1, 3) + λ(2, 3) = 1
λ(1, 2), λ(1, 3), λ(2, 3) ≥ 0
(P2) max X2({2}) + X2({2,3})2 +X3({3})
subject to
λ(1, 2) : X2({2}) +X2({3}) +X2({2, 3}) ≤ 1
λ(1, 3) : X3({3}) ≤ 1
λ(2, 3) : X3({3}) ≤ X2({3}) +X2({2, 3}) + 1
TABLE II: (P1), (D1), (D2), (P2) for K = 3.
timeslots, which are within the allowable timeslots of a pass
utilized in c(H1). Therefore,
SPoAubK ≤ 1 + max
c(·)
K∑
s=1
1
s
= HK + 1 (124)
D. Existence of Stable Coalition Structures
This section investigates the existence of stable coali-
tion structures considering different cost-sharing mechanisms.
First, we define a cyclic preference as sequences (i1, ..., is)
and (G1, ..., Gs), where ik ∈ Gk ∩ Gk+1 for all k ≤ s − 1,
and is ∈ Gs ∩G1, such that
ui1(pi1(G1)) > ui1(pi1(G2)),
ui2(pi2(G2)) > ui2(pi2(G3)),
...
uis(pis(Gs)) > uis(pis(G1))
Lemma 11. If there exists no cyclic preference, there always
exists a stable coalition structure. Furthermore, such a stable
coalition structure can be found in time nO(K).
Proof. We include the standard argument for completeness
(see, e.g., [12] for dynamic coalition formation by local
improvements). Consider a directed graph G = (NK , E) on
the set NK , {S ∈ 2N : |S| ≤ K} of subsets of size
at most K. For two sets G1, G2 ∈ NK , we define an edge
(G1, G2) ∈ E if and only if there is a participant i ∈ G1∩G2
such that ui(G1) < ui(G2). Then the existence of a cyclic
preference is equivalent to the existence of a directed cycle in
G. Thus if there exists no cyclic preference, then G is acyclic
and hence has at least one sink.
Let P be a maximal subset of sinks in G with the property
that any two distinct nodes G,G′ ∈ P are pairwise disjoint.
Let S be the set of participants covered by P , and G′ be the
subgraph of G obtained by deleting all the nodes containing
some participant in S.
By induction, there is a stable coalition structure P ′ among
the set of participants S′ , N\S. It follows that P ∪ P ′
16
is a stable coalition structure on the set of all participants.
Indeed, if there is a blocking coalition G1 then G1 ∩ S 6= ∅
(since otherwise P ′ is not stable among the participants in S′).
But then there must exist i ∈ S such that contain ui(G1) >
ui(G2), where G2 ∈ P is the coalition containing i. This
would imply that (G2, G1) ∈ E contradicting that G2 is a
sink in G.
Theorem 8. For equal-split cost-sharing, there always exists
a stable coalition structure.
Proof. If there exists a cyclic preference, defined by (i1, ..., is)
and (G1, ..., Gs), then
ui1(p
eq
i1
(G1)) = ci1 −
c(G1)
|G1| > ci1 −
c(G2)
|G2| = ui1(p
eq
i1
(G2)),
ui2(p
eq
i2
(G2)) = ci2 −
c(G2)
|G2| > ci2 −
c(G3)
|G3| = ui2(p
eq
i2
(G3)),
...
uis(p
eq
is
(Gs)) = cis −
c(Gs)
|Gs| > cis −
c(G1)
|G1| = uis(p
eq
is
(G1))
Summing the above equations, one obtains a contradiction 0 >
0. This completes the proof by Lemma 11.
Theorem 9. For proportional-split cost-sharing, there always
exists a stable coalition structure.
Proof. If ui(p
pp
i (G1)) > ui(p
pp
i (G2)), then
ci− ci · c(G1)∑
j∈G1 cj
> ci− ci · c(G2)∑
j∈G2 cj
⇒ c(G1)∑
j∈G1 cj
<
c(G2)∑
j∈G2 cj
(125)
Thus, if there exists a cyclic preference, then
c(G1)∑
j∈G1 cj
<
c(G2)∑
j∈G2 cj
< · · · < c(Gs)∑
j∈Gs cj
<
c(G1)∑
j∈G1 cj
(126)
Summing the above equations, one obtains a contradiction 0 >
0. This completes the proof by Lemma 11.
Theorem 10. For egalitarian cost-sharing, there always exists
a stable coalition structure.
Proof. If there exists a cyclic preference, then
ui1(p
ega
i1
(G1)) =
(
∑
j∈G1 cj)− c(G1)
|G1|
>
(
∑
j∈G2 cj)− c(G2)
|G2| = ui1(p
ega
i1
(G2)), (127)
ui2(p
ega
i2
(G2)) =
(
∑
j∈G2 cj)− c(G2)
|G2|
>
(
∑
j∈G3 cj)− c(G3)
|G3| = ui2(p
ega
i2
(G3)), (128)
...
uis(p
ega
is
(Gs)) =
(
∑
j∈Gs cj)− c(Gs)
|Gs|
>
(
∑
j∈G1 cj)− c(G1)
|G1| = uis(p
ega
is
(G1)) (129)
Summing the above equations, one obtains a contradiction 0 >
0. This completes the proof by Lemma 11.
Theorem 11. For Nash bargaining solution, there always
exists a stable coalition structure, irrespective of the constraint
of non-negative payments.
Proof. First, if the constraint of non-negative payments is not
considered, then the existence of a stable coalition structure
follows from Corollary 1 and Theorem 10.
Second, if the constraint of non-negative payments is con-
sidered, then ui(pnashi (G)) ≤ ci. Note that there exists at least
one participant i ∈ G for any G ⊆ N , such that pnashi (G) > 0.
Otherwise,
∑
i∈G p
nash
i (G) = c(G) = 0 (which we may
exclude without loss of generality). Suppose that there exists a
cyclic preference, defined by (i1, ..., is) and (G1, ..., Gs). Let
Ht ⊆ Gt be the set of participants with positive payment in
each Gt, that is, pnashi (Gt) > 0 for all i ∈ Ht. By Lemma 7,
it follows that
ui(p
nash
i (Gt)) =
{
(
∑
j∈Ht cj)−c(Gt)
|Ht| , if i ∈ Ht
ci, if i 6∈ Ht
(130)
By Lemma 7, if i 6∈ Ht, ui(pnashi (Gt)) = ci ≤
(
∑
j∈Ht cj)−c(Gt)
|Ht| . Hence, ui(p
nash
i (Gt)) ≤
(
∑
j∈Ht cj)−c(Gt)
|Ht|
for all i ∈ Gt.
Note that if ui(pnashi (Gt)) > ui(p
nash
i (Gr′)), then
ui(p
nash
i (Gr′)) 6= ci because ui(pnashi (G)) ≤ ci. If there
exists a cyclic preference, then
(
∑
j∈H1 cj)− c(G1)
|H1| ≥ ui1(p
nash
i1 (G1))
>ui1(p
nash
i1 (G2)) =
(
∑
j∈H2 cj)− c(G2)
|H2| , (131)
(
∑
j∈H2 cj)− c(G2)
|H2| ≥ ui2(p
nash
i2 (G2))
>ui2(p
nash
i2 (G3)) =
(
∑
j∈H3 cj)− c(G3)
|H3| , (132)
...
(
∑
j∈Hs cj)− c(Gs)
|Hs| ≥ uis(p
nash
is (Gs))
>uis(p
nash
is (G1)) =
(
∑
j∈H1 cj)− c(G1)
|H1| (133)
Summing the above equations, one obtains a contradiction 0 >
0. This completes the proof by Lemma 11.
E. Usage Based Cost-Sharing
In general, usage based cost-sharing can induce cyclic pref-
erence, and hence, possibly the absence of a stable coalition
structure. However, we can show the existence of a stable
coalition structure in some special cases.
1) Pass Sharing: For any K ≥ 2, we can show that there
always exists a stable coalition structure in the pass sharing
problem, by ruling out any cyclic preference. Without loss of
generality, we assume the average cost rate is 1 (i.e., cf = 1).
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If participants i ∈ G share a pass r, then i’s payment is given
by
pubi (G) = |Ti|+
1
|G| |Tr\(∪j∈GTj)| (134)
If i prefers to share in coalition G with pass r rather than on
G′ with pass r′, then pubi (G) < p
ub
i (G
′), namely,
1
|G| |Tr\(∪j∈GTj)| <
1
|G′| |Tr′\(∪j∈G′Tj)|. (135)
If there exists a cyclic preference defined by (i1, ..., is),
(G1, ..., Gs) and (r1, ..., rs), then
1
|G1| |Tr1\(∪j∈G1Tj)| <
1
|G2| |Tr2\(∪j∈G2Tj)|
< · · ·
<
1
|Gs| |Trs\(∪j∈GsTj)| <
1
|G1| |Tr\(∪j∈G1Tj)|. (136)
This generates a contradiction. Hence, there always exists a
stable coalition structure.
2) Hotel Room Sharing: When K = 2, we can show that
there always exists a stable coalition structure, by ruling out
any cyclic preference. Let τi = touti − tini be the interval
length required by participant i, and τi,j be the length of the
overlapped interval, if participants i, j share a room. Without
loss of generality, we assume the room rate is 1. Then, i’s
payment is given by
pubi ({i, j}) = (τi − τi,j) +
1
2
τi,j = τi − 1
2
τi,j (137)
If i prefers to share with j rather than k, then pubi ({i, j}) <
pubi ({i, k}), namely, τi,j > τi,k. If there exists a cyclic
preference (i1, ..., is), then
τi1,is > τi1,i2 > ... > τis−1,is > τi1,is (138)
This generates a contradiction. Hence, there always exists a
stable coalition structure.
3) Taxi-ride Sharing: There exists an instance with no
stable coalition structure even for K = 2, as illustrated in
Fig. 4. Participant ik can share a ride with participant ik−1
or participant ik+1 (whereas participant is can share with
is−1 or participant i1). Let the cost from vsis to v
d
ik−1 be
c(vsis , v
d
ik−1). Assume that c(v
s
is
, vdik−1) is identical for all k, so
are c(vsis , v
s
ik+1
), c(vdis , v
d
ik+1
) and c(vsik , v
d
ik
) for all k. Also,
we assume that
c(vsik , v
d
ik
) >
1
2
c(vsis , v
d
ik−1) + c(v
d
ik−1 , v
d
ik
)
>c(vsik , v
s
ik+1
) +
1
2
c(vsik+1 , v
d
ik
) (139)
Hence, participant ik prefers to share with participant ik+1,
rather than with participant ik−1. This generates a cyclic
preference (i1, ..., is). If there are odd number of participants
arranged in a loop, then this can give no stable coalition
structure. We remark that Eqn. (139) can be attained, when
s is sufficiently large.
Fig. 4: An illustration for taxi-ride sharing problem with no
stable coalition structure considering usage based cost-sharing.
F. NP-Hardness
This section studies the hardness of solving K-
MINCOALITION.
Theorem 12. K-MINCOALITION is NP-hard for K ≥ 3.
Proof. First, define the set of coalitions with at most size K
by NK , {S ∈ 2N : |S| ≤ K}.
K-MINCOALITION can be reduced from NP-hard problem
(EXACT-COVER-BY-K-SETS), defined as follows. Given a
collection G of subsets of N , {1, ..., n}, each of size K,
find a pairwise-disjoint sub-collection G′ that covers N , that
is, S ∩ S′ = ∅ for all distinct S, S′ ∈ G′ and ⋃S∈G′ = N .
Given an instance G of EXACT-COVER-BY-K-SETS, we
construct an instance of K-MINCOALITION as follows. For
S ∈ NK , we define c(S) as follows:
c(S) =

1 if S ∈ G,
1 if S ∈ NK\G, |S| ≤ K − 1,
2 if S ∈ NK\G, |S| = K
(140)
One can check that (C1) and (C2) are satisfied. Now consider a
feasible solution to K-MINCOALITION and assume it consists
of ni sets of size i not from G, for i = 1, ...,K, and n′K
sets of size K from G. Then the total cost of the solution is∑K−1
i=1 ni+n
′
K +2nK . Subject to
∑K−1
i=1 i ·ni+K ·n′K +K ·
nK = n, this cost is uniquely minimized when n′K = n/K,
that is, when there is a disjoint collection from G covering
N . Indeed, the minimum of linear relaxation of this integer
programming problem is determined by the minimum ratio
test:
min
{
min
i∈{1,...,K−1}
{
1
i
}
,
2
K
,
1
K
}
=
1
K
(141)
On the other hand, if the answer to the instance G of EXACT-
COVER-BY-K-SETS is NO, then this unique minimum cannot
be achieved by an integral solution, yielding a solution of cost
strictly larger than nK .
